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ABSTRACT This paper develops a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) for a heating,
ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system in railway. HVAC is a safety critical system which must
ensure emergency ventilation in case of fire and in case of loss of primary ventilation functions. A study
of the HVAC’s critical areas is mandatory to optimize its reliability and availability and consequently to
guarantee a low operation and maintenance cost. The first part of the paper describes the FMECA which
is performed and reported to highlight the main criticalities of the HVAC system under analysis. Secondly,
the paper deals with the problem of the evaluation of a threshold risk value, which can distinguish negligible
and critical failure modes. Literature barely considers the problem of an objective risk threshold estimation.
Therefore, a new analytical method based on finite difference is introduced to find a univocal risk threshold
value. The method is then tested on two Risk Priority Number datasets related to the same HVAC. The
threshold obtained in both cases is a good tradeoff between the risk mitigation and the cost investment for
the corrective actions required to mitigate the risk level. Finally, the threshold obtained with the proposed
method is compared with the methods available in literature. The comparison shows that the proposed finite
difference method is a well-structured technique, with a low computational cost. Furthermore, the proposed
approach provides results in line with the literature, but it completely deletes the problem of subjectivity.
INDEX TERMS Failure analysis, HVAC, railway safety, reliability, risk analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, global transportation systems such as aircraft,
motor vehicles, trains, and ships carry billions of tons of
goods and billions of passengers. System failures can impact
the global economy, the environment, and transportation reli-
ability and safety [1]. In railways, device failure, whether
electrical or mechanical, can usually be attributed to the
degradation of a given material under stress. Stress generally
refers to any external agent capable of causing degradation to
occur in the material properties of a device such that it can
no longer function properly in its intended application. For
this reason, as well as the growing complexity of equipment
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and the rapidly increasing cost incurred by loss of operation
and maintenance, interest in RAMS (Reliability, Availabil-
ity, Maintainability and Safety) and diagnostic parameters is
growing in many industrial fields [2]–[5]. Rail industry is
rapidly developing, and rail becomes ever more viable in a
wide range of regions. Therefore the passenger experience
and comfort has become a major concern for operators in
the world [6], [7]. An efficient heating, ventilation and air
conditioning system (HVAC) is the best way of regulating
temperature and air quality to contrast the overcrowding
and overheating of the carriages. Railway temperature reg-
ulation is very challenging because of fluctuating climates,
fluctuating heat loads and fluctuating speeds. Trains could
cross different countries with different climates, nevertheless
HVAC equipment must constantly adapt to diverse climates.
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During a train travel, lots of passengers can board and depart
train cars rapidly, that’s cause a constantly variation of the
heat (provided by bodies) in the carriage. HVACs must
detect the heat changes and regulate the temperature conse-
quently. The high speed of the train cause high gravitational
forces on the HVAC which can produce damage to coils,
so industries have to design HVAC able to tolerate high
gravitational forces and high vibrations.
This paper builds on this interest and develops a Failure
Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) for a HVAC
system in a high-speed train. A study of the HVAC’s critical
areas is mandatory to optimize its reliability and availability.
The critical components identified by FMECA needs to be
fully analyzed in order to find countermeasures and lower
the risk level. The identification of the most critical parts
is usually performed by experts, leading to a high subjec-
tive decision. Alternatively, some companies apply correc-
tive actions in a hierarchical order starting from the most
critical components. Then, countermeasures are applied until
the budget allows it. The major flaw of this cost-oriented
approach is that some critical risk could not be mitigated.
For some application this approach is valuable, quite the
opposite safety related applications such railway systems
require a more precautionary point of view. Consequently,
it is extremely important to identify which components are
critical and which are not by means of a risk threshold.
The international standard IEC60812 [8] which defines the
FMECA technique does not explain how to evaluate a risk
threshold value. Furthermore, only few papers in recent lit-
erature deals with this issue. This work introduces a new
analytical approach to overcome this limit by estimating a
Risk Priority Number threshold. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows: section II illustrates the state of the
art of FMECA in railway field and the existing threshold
methods, section III describes the HVAC system in railway
application, section IV illustrates the FMECA applied on the
‘‘Passenger unit’’ of the HVAC and finally section V proposes
a new method to distinguish the negligible failure modes
with the critical failure modes and tests its validness on two
different datasets.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
is a widely used technique because it is a structured and
systematic procedure which allows to identify the criticalities
of a system. It is a powerful tool for early identification of
failure mode in various industrial applications [9], [10]. It is
also widely applied for reliability assessment of safety critical
systems, such as in [11]. FMECA includes ameans of ranking
the severity of the failure modes to allow prioritization of
countermeasures [12], [13]. This is done by combining the
severity measure and frequency of occurrence to produce
a metric called criticality, also known as the Risk Priority
Number (RPN).
The analysis is usually done by identifying the failure
modes and failure mechanisms, their respective causes, and
their immediate and final effects. The analytical results can
be presented on a worksheet that contains a core of essential
information for the entire system and the details developed
for that specific system. The worksheet shows the ways the
system could potentially fail, the components and their failure
modes that would be the cause of system failure and the
cause(s) of each individual failure mode. Finally, there is a
ranking of the frequency of occurrence (usually called O),
a ranking of the severity measure (usually called S) and a
ranking to take into account the detection of each failuremode
(usually called D).
The three factors are combined to calculate the Risk Prior-
ity Number (RPN), as in the following expression [14]:
RPN = O · S · D (1)
where:
• Occurrence O is the probability that a failure mode will
happen; therefore, it is strongly linked to the failure rate
of the equipment. It can assume integer values belonging
to the interval [1; 10] where 10 is the most probable
failure mode.
• Severity S defines the strength of the failure impact on
the system. It can assume integer values belonging to the
interval [1; 10] where 10 represents the worst scenario.
• Detection D indicates the possibility of diagnosing
the failure mode before its effects are manifested in the
system. It can assume integer values belonging to the
interval [1; 10] where 10 is the least diagnosable event.
RPN can judge the risk level of failure modes; with this
knowledge, designers can take effective actions to eliminate
high risk failure modes [15], [16]. The method is simple and
convenient, but its strong subjectivity and unified evaluation
standards may result in inaccurate risk determination. Thus,
it may have a misleading effect on establishing improvement
actions. In addition, after determining the RPN risk sequence,
it is necessary to implement corrective actions for the failure
mode whose RPN value is higher than the acceptable risk
standard.
In the last years, many studies have been carried out
to analyze the failure occurrence of railway equipment as
well as to evaluate the impact of a failure on transporta-
tion (see for example [17]). Cheng et al. [18] evaluate
the reliability of metro door systems using a FMECA pro-
cedures. Kim et al. [19] investigate the effects of a failure
of the brake system for a railroad unit with a FMECA.
Dinmohammadi et al. [17] analyze the risk associated to a
passenger door system. Carretero et al. [20] uses FMECA as
starting point for the development of a maintenance plan in
railway infrastructure. Deng et al. [9] proposes a new frame-
work based on FMECA method to study the vulnerability of
a subway system. Marquez et al. [21] carry out a Reliability
CentredMaintenance based on FMECA for a railway turnout.
The international standard IEC 60812 (2018) [8] which
defines and standardizes the FMECA doeas not sufficiently
explain how to univocal distinguish the non-critical modes
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with the critical modes which need corrective actions. Many
works in recent literature highlight some drawbacks of the
RPN and try to propose different methods to overcome that
problems. Several papers propose different RPN formulations
introducing weight factors or innovative coefficients and
parameters (e.g. [22], [23]). Others solve the problems intro-
ducing fuzzy-logic or other analytical theories in FMECA,
see for instance [24], [25]. However, most of the papers
does not deal with the RPN threshold estimation problem.
Therefore, the aim of this manuscript is to fill this gap propos-
ing a methodology for threshold estimation regardless the
application field or the mathematical model used to calculate
the RPN.
Usually the threshold for the modes is subjectively set
by the judgement of multiple experts in the matter (see for
instance but not only [26]–[29]), and only few papers propose
their own approaches for the threshold value.
Kim et al. [30] combines RPN with SOD (Severity-
Occurrence-Detectability, a simple composition of the
3 scores) to prioritize high severity of the modes in risk
categories.
Bluvband et al. [31], [32] highlight for the first time that
RPNs follows a trend and recommend a graphical tool for
RPN analysis. Firstly, the RPN are plotted ordered from the
smallest to the largest. Bluvband illustrates that the RPNs of a
complete FMECA form a right-skewed distribution, the crit-
ical modes belong to the upper-right part while the negligible
modes to the first tail on the left. The threshold value is
calculated in a qualitative way by the division between the
negligible failure modes and the critical failure modes. The
method proposed by Bluvband [31], [32] is an intuitive and
simple graphical tool. The idea at the basis of this approach
seems to be very interesting. The main concern of the method
is related to the subjectivity for the division of the two datasets
characterized by different slopes.
Zhao et al [33] propose a method to obtain a more objective
and accurate RPN analysis. The RPNs are plotted ordered
by size, then using linear regression the RPNs are fitted
with a polynomial approximation of the first order, finally
the confidence levels are plotted on the same figure. The
threshold RPN is determined by the turning point from the
confidence levels. This approach is based on a simple linear
approximation method, but in many practical cases the RPNs
do not follow a linear trend. Therefore, the approximation of
the values with a single straight line provides a significant
error.
Another procedure to evaluate the threshold value is the
80:20 Pareto principle [34]–[36]. According to this technique,
20% of failure modes produce 80% of the total RPNs. In con-
trast to the Bluvband method, the Pareto approach uses a bar
chart where the failure modes are sorted from the highest risk
priority number to the lowest. This bar graph is combined
with a cumulative distribution function that shows the percent
contribution of all preceding failures. The 80:20 rule is used
to distinguish the negligible and critical modes. Pareto chart
is not suitable for some kind of risk-assessment application
because it is not always verified that the 80% of the crit-
icalities arise from 20% of the causes, or in other words
that the 80% of the RPNs represents the 20% of the failure
modes.
A preliminary study on RPN threshold has been already
published in [37] where a statistical approach based on a
boxplot was compared with the other method proposed in
literature. It is an easy, practical and efficient solution rec-
ommended as a first evaluation to distinguish critical and
negligible failure modes. The method proposed in [37] could
be used as a first screening of the failure modes, while more
accurate and quantitative approach is required in case of
safety-critical system (such railway systems).
III. HEATING VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING
This work deals with the risk assessment and RPN threshold
estimation of a Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning (HVAC)
system. HVAC is the technology of indoor and vehicular
environmental comfort. The objectives of HVAC systems
are to provide an acceptable level of occupancy comfort
and process function, to maintain good indoor air quality
(IAQ), and to keep system costs and energy requirements to
a minimum [38].
HVAC is an important part of residential structures, such as
single family homes, apartment buildings, hotels and senior
living facilities; it is also essential in medium to large indus-
trial and office buildings, such as skyscrapers and hospitals,
and in vehicles, such as trains, ships and submarines. In all
these structures, safe and healthy conditions are regulated
with respect to temperature and humidity, using fresh air from
outdoors.
In underground trains, the influx of a large number of
people and the presence of moving trains generate a reduction
in oxygen and an increase in heat and pollutants. Mechanical
ventilation is required to achieve the necessary air exchange
and grant users of the underground train systems comfortable
conditions. Ventilation systems have a second and even more
important purpose: to guarantee safety in the event of a fire
emergency. Moreover, to create a safe and clean environment,
ventilation is required both in the tunnels and in the stations.
Consequently, in high-speed trains the HVAC is a safety criti-
cal system, it must be working properly during the entire train
journey to ensure emergency ventilation in case of hazardous
events.
Furthermore, an HVAC system has also comfort related
functionalities: it has to move heat to where it is wanted
(the conditioned space), or remove heat from where it is
not wanted (the conditioned space), and put it where it is
unobjectionable (the outside air).
The heating and air-conditioning system, whose central
unit is usually placed on the roof of the train, ensures the ther-
mal comfort and the quality of the air on board. Temperature
and air quality sensors also play a decisive role, because as
well as managing the temperature, the system recycles the air
and therefore regulates the amount of oxygen available in the
train cars [39].
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FIGURE 1. Examples of HVAC units located on a high-speed train.
The first step of the functioning of the air condition unit is
the suction of warm air by ventilators from the train exterior,
then a liquid refrigerant absorb the heat, therefore the heat is
rejected outside the train and finally cooled air is released into
the train interior. A sensor measures the temperature and the
quality of the air inside the train, then the air conditioning
absorbs in the air, mixing 1/3 of external air with 2/3 of
internal air. The unit reinjects recycled, filtered air into the
train unit.
Each car is equipped with two units to provide Heating,
Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) to the car. In order
to ensure the proper system functionality, a control system
is required to manage all the HVAC. In particular tempera-
ture and humidity control are regulated through inside and
outside sensors connected directly to a microcontroller-based
unit.
IV. RISK ANALYSIS OF HVAC
In order to identify all the risks associated to the use of an
HVAC system, in this work a Failure Modes, Effects and
Criticality Analysis is proposed. Figure 1 shows the loca-
tion of the train’s HVAC system [40], [41]. There are two
units located on the roof of the train: one for the cabin area
(called ‘‘Cabin unit’’ in the following) and another one for
the passenger area or salon (called ‘‘Passenger unit’’ in the
following) [42]–[44]. The system under analysis is an HVAC
assembly in S-121, a high-speed CAF train. Table 1 describes
the high level taxonomy of the HVAC under study, according
to ISO 14224 [45].
Figure 2 shows a block diagram of the ‘‘Passenger unit’’
HVAC under analysis. In particular it is composed by four
different sub-systems: cooling, heating, ventilation and con-
trol system. The cooling and heating systems aim is to pro-
vide a thermal comfort inside the train (the cooling provides
air-conditioned while the heating increases the temperature),
ventilation provides fresh air and finally the control has to
regulate and manage all the other devices. Each system is also
divided into several subunit as shown in the figure.
The ‘‘Cabin unit’’ is a bit different from the ‘‘Passenger
unit’’. It is simpler, it is composed by a lower number of
components and it uses the control system integrated in the
‘‘Passenger unit’’.
TABLE 1. High-level taxonomy of the system under test.
TABLE 2. Criteria for severity S assessment.
TABLE 3. Failure mode occurrence O related to probability of occurrence.
Classification criteria are used in order to consistently
attribute the level of severity, occurrence and detection to
each failure mode. These criteria are established in part
from the literature and others are specifically chosen for the
type of device analyzed. Table 2 illustrates the criteria for
the choice of the severity index, Table 3 gives the criteria
for the assignment of occurrence values and Table 4 shows
the assessment of the detection value. The above-mentioned
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FIGURE 2. Block diagram of HVAC under study.
TABLE 4. Failure mode detection D evaluation criteria.
tables were developed to analyze both ‘‘Passenger unit’’ and
‘‘Cabin unit’’.
A severity rank is allocated to the failure effect from each
failure mode based on the severity of the effect on the overall
system performance and safety in light of the system require-
ments, objectives and constraints [8].
Table 3 propose the assessment of the occurrence based
on the mode failure rate value. If λ is the failure rate of the
component, then the mode failure rate λM is given by:
λM = α · λ (2)
where the failure rate fraction expressed by α represents the
weight of the mode compared to the other failure modes.
In particular, a 1-to-10 scale is assessed, where the higher is
the mode failure rate, the higher is the occurrence rate.
The failure rate is generally expressed in failure/hour, but
for this application, the information on time is less meaning-
ful than distance. In fact, trains only work certain hours, so the
information on the distance travelled is more important and
more significant than time. Therefore, the failure rate of the
mode in Table 3 are expressed in FMPK - failures per million
kilometers.
Table 4 gives the detection criteria used in the case study.
Since detection data were barey available for the HVAC
system under study, the proposed scale varies from 1 to 3.
Table 5 shows an extract of the whole FMECA for the
‘‘Passenger unit’’ of the HVAC system studied. The columns
report the following information:
• Failure mode description: manner in which an equip-
ment or machine failure can occur.
• Failure rate fraction (α): a percentage which describes
the weight of each failure mode in the component. The
sum of every failure rate fraction has to be 100%.
FIGURE 3. Representation of the whole ‘‘Passenger unit’’ FMECA result.
All the RPNs are plotted ordered by size.
• Failure rate for failure mode (FPMK): frequency with
which the failure mode appears, expressed in failures per
million kilometers.
• Failure causes: causes of the failure mode.
• Local effect: normally limited to the effects on the item
exhibiting the specific failure mode.
• Global effect: effects of the failure as it would be
seen at the next higher/lower level (within the system/
equipment structure).
• Occurrence (O): rating of the likelihood of occurrence
of each cause of failure
• Severity (S): rating of the severity of each effect of
failure
• Detection (D): rating of the likelihood of prior detection
for each cause of failure (i.e. the likelihood of detect-
ing the problem before it reaches the end user or
customer.
• Risk priority number (RPN): product of the three ratings.
Failure data were provided by the HVAC manufacturer
‘‘MERAK.’’ Note that data do not consider any stress applied.
The whole ‘‘Passenger unit’’ FMECA is composed
of 109 different modes and table 5 shows only an extract
of them. The result of the whole FMECA are reported
in Figure 3 which illustrates all the 109 Risk Priority Number
ordered by size from the smallest to the largest, to improve
the readability of the values.
The minimum RPN value is 3, associated to the relay, and
the maximum is 216, associated to the blower.
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TABLE 5. Extract from the whole FMECA for the ‘‘Passenger unit’’ of the HVAC system under analysis.
The figure also highlights several duplicates in the risk
priority number scale, in particular the maximum repetition
frequency is related to RPN 72, which can be formed by
14 different combinations.
Also, the ‘‘Cabin unit’’ of the HVAC system was analyzed
using the FMECA procedure. The complete results were not
reported in this work for the sake of brevity. In this second
analysis, the minimum RPN value is 4, associated to the
pipes, and the maximum is 168, associated to the emergency
inverter. Also, in the ‘‘Cabin unit’’ FMECA there are sev-
eral duplicates in the risk priority number, in particular the
maximum repetition frequency is for the RPN 12, which can
be formed by 12 different combinations.
V. A NEW APPROACH FOR THE
THRESHOLD ESTIMATION
The failure modes characterized by high RPNs have to
be distinguish from the modes with lower RPN values.
As explained in section II, very few papers in literature deal
with this concept. Therefore, a new analytical approach is
introduced to overcome the subjectivity and to find a RPN
threshold value.
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FIGURE 4. Flowchart of the new procedure for risk priority number
threshold estimation.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEDURE
Figure 4 shows the flowchart of the proposed procedure. The
first step is to consider the frequency of each RPN, i.e. the
repetition number of each RPN.
For each unique RPN the forward finite difference is cal-
culated. Then the difference is weighted with the size of the
sample (frequency of each unique RPN).
In particular, the weighted finite difference Diffi is defined
as the ratio between the forward finite difference of the unique
RPN and the frequency of the unique RPN:
Diff i =
RPN i+1 − RPN i
frequencyi+1
(3)
where RPN i+1 and RPN i represent the (i+ 1)-th and the i-th
unique failure modes respectively, while frequencyi+1 stands
for the repetition frequency of the (i+ 1)-th unique RPN.
As the first derivative of a continuous function represents
the instantaneous rate of change, the finite difference repre-
sents the same concept for discrete data set. So, the higher is
the difference, the higher is the variation between two con-
secutive values. The forward finite difference introduces the
repetition of the RPN value as denominator in order to take
into account how the repeated values lower the increment.
The following step is the identification of the local max-
ima (peaks) of the finite differenceDiff . Each peak represents
a remarkable increase of two nearby RPNs, the higher the
peak the greater the RPN increase. The aim of the proposed
procedure is to precisely identify a value that divides the
ordered RPNs trend in two different groups: the negligible
modes characterized by a gradual change of the RPN values,
and the critical modes characterized by a sudden increase of
those value. Consequently, the identification of the peaks in
the finite difference trend is a fundamental step that allows to
quantitatively understand the RPN increments.
Then, the following steps are used to identify the ‘‘first
significant peak’’, which is the peak that divides the RPNs
into two well-defined and different subsets. In order to find
this peak, the proposed procedure is based on the evaluation
of the percentage difference 1Peak i between each peak and
the previous ones (step 4). More in detail, equations (4)(5)
explain the evaluation of percentage increment between the
peak i and the mean value of the three previous peaks PPi.
PPi =
Peaki−1 + Peaki−2 + Peaki−3
3
(4)
1Peak i = 100 ·
Peak i − PPi
PPi
% (5)
Then, step 5 consists in the identification of the maximum
value of the percentage differences evaluated in the previ-
ous step. The peak characterized by the maximum value of
percentage difference is the ‘‘first significant peak’’ and the
associated RPN divides the RPNs into two subsets.
The evaluation of1Peak i as the simple increment between
the peak i and the peak i − 1 could lead to untrustworthy
results since the percentage increase is great enough also
for the lower peaks. Moreover, comparing each peak with
the same constant value (e.g. the minimum peak, or the first
peak, or the first finite difference value, etc.) leads always
to identify the peak with the greater value, regardless the
dataset. As explained before, the aim of this procedure is
not to identify the highest peak, instead it is to identify the
first peak much higher than all the previous peaks. Conse-
quently, 1Peak i has been evaluated as the percentage differ-
ence between a peak and a small set of previous peaks. More
in detail, the mean value of the three previous peaks was used
since it provides effective results in several datasets.
The final step consists in the identification of the unique
RPN which divides the dataset into two subsets. The index
of the ‘‘first significant peak’’ is the index of the unique RPN
associated to the threshold level.
The proposed approach uses the idea of the identification
of two different data set but allows to delete the subjectivity
issue that influences most of the previous works using an
analytical procedure based on weighted forward finite differ-
ences.
The following subsections illustrates the application of
the procedure to different FMECAs. Firstly, the proposed
procedure has been applied to the ‘‘Passenger unit’’ FMECA
described in the previous section. Then, it has also been
applied to the ‘‘Cabin unit’’ FMECA in order to validate the
method with a different dataset.
B. CASE STUDY 1: ‘‘PASSENGER UNIT’’ FMECA
In this section the procedure is applied to a first case study,
so the data coming from the ‘‘Passenger unit’’ FMECA are
used to test the effectiveness of the proposed method.
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FIGURE 5. Step 1: repetition number of each RPN value. The data referred
to the ‘‘Passenger unit’’ FMECA.
FIGURE 6. Application of the proposed procedure to the ‘‘Passenger unit’’
of the HVAC. The top plot illustrates the steps from 2 to 5 of the
procedure, while the bottom plot is used to carry out the final step.
Figure 5 shows the first step of the procedure. The height of
the bar represents how the RPN (in the abscissa) is repeated in
the FMECA, higher is the bar more frequent is the mode. This
plot helps to identify all the unique RPNs and their relative
number of repetitions. The value of RPNs unique numbers
(the number of bars in fig. 5) is n = 31 so the finite difference
Diff will be composed by 30 elements.
The top plot of fig. 6 illustrates the steps from 2 to 5 of the
procedure carried out on the ‘‘Passenger unit’’. The forward
finite differences are calculated, and the values are illustrated
as blue dots in the top of figure 6. The figure highlights
that the first twenty markers are lower than 3, while the
21st value is very different respect to the others. This high
value represents a significant difference between the 21st and
22nd unique RPNs, which involves a rapid increase of the
subsequent ordered RPN. In the top graph of Fig. 6 the peaks
are marked using red triangles, 8 peaks were identified in the
‘‘Passenger unit’’ FMECA.
FIGURE 7. Division of risk priority numbers identified in the ‘‘Passenger
unit’’ FMECA in negligible and critical values.
Near each peak there is a label indicating the percentage
difference 1Peak i between this peak and the three previous
peaks. The index of the ‘‘first significant peak’’ is the one
that corresponds to the maximum value of 1Peak i. It is
highlighted using a red dotted line, which indicates the index
of the unique RPN associated to the threshold level. The
final step is illustrated on the bottom plot of fig. 6, which
corresponds to the identification of the RPN threshold value.
This graph highlights that the corresponding RPN to the
21th index is the value 108, which will be the threshold
value.
All the RPNs higher than the threshold have to be consid-
ered critical, while all the RPNs lower than or equal to 108 are
considered negligible. Figure 7 shows all the values of RPN
evaluated for the ‘‘Passenger unit’’ FMECA (the same data
of Figure 3) and the threshold line (black dotted line). All the
RPNs below the threshold are illustrated using green dots and
are considered negligible, while the red dots stand for the
RPNs above the threshold which are considered critical.
In the ‘‘Passenger unit’’ FMECA, 16 out of 109 failure
modes were found unacceptable. This means that nearly 15%
of the failure modes require some sort of corrective action.
C. CASE STUDY 2: ‘‘CABIN UNIT’’ FMECA
This subsection tests the proposed procedure with another
set of data coming from the analysis of the cabin unit of the
sameHVAC. A FMECA has been developed and the resulting
RPNs are used as input of the method.
The top plot of figure 8 shows the trends of the forward
finite differences (step 2). The peaks are highlighted by red
triangles (step 3), and from a qualitative point of view it is
possible to note a sudden increase of the difference between
the 20th and 21st unique RPN. To quantitative identify the
first significant peak, step 4 and 5 are used with this dataset.
Clearly the highest variation is the 21st unique RPN with a
408.7% increase.
Then step 6 allows to identify the threshold value associ-
ated to the 21st unique RPN, the bottom of figure 8 shows
all the unique Risk Priority Numbers and their indexes. The
threshold associated to the 21st index is the RPN = 70.
Figure 9 shows all the Risk Priority Numbers as dots and
the threshold limit. In this case study the method identifies
12 critical failure modes over 90 total modes. So, in this case
the 13% of the modes needs to be mitigated.
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FIGURE 8. Application of the proposed procedure to the ‘‘Cabin unit’’ of
the HVAC. The top plot illustrates the steps from 2 to 5 of the procedure,
while the bottom plot is used to carry out the final step.
FIGURE 9. Division of risk priority numbers identified in the ‘‘Cabin unit’’
FMECA in negligible and critical values.
D. COMPARISON
Finally, the proposed procedure was compared with the other
approaches available in literature. The results achieved for
both case studies are summarized in table 6 which includes
the RPN threshold value and the number of critical failure
modes.
The comparison firstly highlights the inadequacy of Zhao
and Pareto approaches for this kind of application.
In both the case studies, the method proposed by Zhao
identifies the highest RPN threshold, on the other hand the
80-20 Pareto principle identifies the lowest value.
Such high threshold, given by the Zhao method, could not
be reasonable in many safety-related applications, because it
requires a risk mitigation only for few modes.
While the low threshold given by the Pareto principle
requires an expensive plan for the risk mitigation of the
modes, that could be not applicable for many companies.
The proposed method provides intermediate results, in line
with the threshold proposed by Bluvband, mostly because
both start from the same idea.
TABLE 6. Results comparison achieved using the proposed method and
the other method available in literature.
The main advantage of the proposed approach is that it
completely deletes the subjectivity, still present in Bluvband.
Finally, several kinds of risk mitigation actions could be
taken into account in order to lower the Risk priority number
above the threshold.
A very efficient improvement is to get some changes in the
design of the equipment by using components with improved
quality and performances, this will lower the failure rate of the
component and consequently the occurrence, but it leads to a
cost impact for the industry. The use of condition monitoring
(sensors which monitor the state of the system) allows to
monitor the health state of the system and to diagnose failure
before it occurs. So the introduction of these maintenance
tools lowers the detection index. Also the use of redundancy
system allows to obtain a lower Risk Priority Number, but this
solution needs high cost to be performed.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper shows how a complete risk assessment should
be designed for a complex system such as a HVAC system
for railway application. HVAC is a system composed by
several components both mechanics and electronics; a full
and complete study of its risk is mandatory to identify which
are the most critical items. Some approaches were proposed
in literature to find a threshold valuewhich distinguish critical
failure modes to negligible modes after carried out a FMECA
procedure. Some of them are not suitable and not efficient
while other are only qualitative procedure of the identification
of two data sets. To overcome the subjectivity of the establish-
ing a threshold between the acceptability and unacceptability
of a risk, a new analytical procedure has been proposed in
this paper. The method starts with the aim to identify two
different subsets characterized with two different trends: the
first subset of RPNs grows gradually and the second has
a sudden increase. A weighted forward finite difference is
introduced to calculate where is located the variation of the
slope, then the ‘‘first significant’’ peak of the difference leads
to the identification of the threshold value. The strength and
effectiveness of the proposed procedure have been tested on
two different datasets coming from two different units of the
HVAC: ‘‘Passenger unit’’ and ‘‘Cabin unit’’. Finally, the pro-
cedure was compared with the other approaches available in
literature to highlight the significance of the results.
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The proposed approach has proven to be a powerful solu-
tion in risk assessment since it uses the idea of the identifica-
tion of two different subsets allowing to delete the subjectivity
issue that influences most of the previous works by means
of an analytical procedure based on weighted forward finite
differences.
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